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 Monotonicity of Social Optima
With Respect to Participation Constraints




In this paper we consider solutions which select from the core. For games with
side payments with at least four players, it is well-known that no core-selection sat-
isﬁes monotonicity for all coalitions; for the particular class of core-selections found
by maximizing a social welfare function over the core, we investigate whether such
solutions are monotone for a given coalition. It is shown that if this is the case then
the solution actually maximizes aggregate coalition payoﬀ on the core. Furthermore,
the social welfare function to be maximized exhibits larger marginal social welfare
with respect to the payoﬀ of any member of the coalition. The results may be used
to show that there are no monotonic core selection rules of this type in the context of
games without side payments.
JEL classiﬁcation: I10
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1 Introduction
Much of recent literature in game theory deals with the tension between social values and
the self-seeking actions of individual agents. If we consider allocation rules of a given
society this tension implies that allocation rules based on social values must take into
account the incentive constraints of individual subgroups of society.
A particular version of this social allocation problem is that of ﬁnding a suitable
solution to a coalitional game. Here, the tension between social values and individual
actions becomes a question of deﬁning solution concepts that upholds social values but
does so under various participation constraints, for example, in the form of coalitional
stability (or core-constraints). For instance, social value may consist of maximizing the
smallest excess of any coalition as in the nucleolus by Schmeidler [12] (which agrees with
the core-constraints), or ﬁnding Lorenz dominating allocation(s) in the core as in Dutta
and Ray [2] and Hougaard, Peleg and Thorlund-Petersen [6].
In the present paper social values are represented by a social welfare function. Hence,
we consider allocations that maximizes social welfare with respect to participation con-
straints in the form of coalitional stability. In other words, we focus on the broad class of
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1solutions that maximizes a (strictly concave) social welfare function over the set of core
allocations. As such, the relevant coalitional games may be thought of as games where
the value of the characteristic function is given in monetary terms - for example, surplus
sharing games or (dually) cost sharing games.
Our particular interest relates to the monotonicity properties of such solutions. Now,
assuming that the participation constraint of a single coalition is increased, all others coali-
tional constraints kept ﬁxed (and without leaving the core empty), then the constrained
maximization of social welfare ensures that the coalition as a whole is either unaﬀected
or better oﬀ than status quo. But we are interested in more than that; the constrained
maximization of social welfare should (weakly) increase the payoﬀ of all individuals in
the coalition so that individual incentives to change (that is to aﬀect the participation
constraints) are in agreement with social values. In other words, social values shall not
prevent social progress.
As such, a suitable allocation rule ought to be monotonic in payoﬀ’s for all possible
coalitions. However, a well known result by Young [15] states that no solution that selects
allocations in the core satisﬁes monotonicity for all coalitions. The result demonstrates
that there is a trade-oﬀ between coalitional stability (that is, selecting from the core) and
coalitional monotonicity.
As both coalitional stability and coalitional monotonicity are central properties many
papers have examined the extent to which these two conﬁcting goals may be reconciled.
For example, on the subclass of convex games the Shapley value is indeed coalitionally
monotonic (Shapley [13], Sprumont [14], Rosenthal [11]), and so is the Dutta-Ray solution
(Hokari, [5], Hougaard, Peleg and Østerdal [7]), whereas the nucleolus is not (Hokari [4]).
Keeping in mind Young’s general impossibility result, we focus on monotonicity with
respect to the worth of any particular coalition (in the following called S-monotonicity)
- for example, in the present context it is obvious that all core selection rules are i-
monotonic. In this paper, we show that S-monotonic allocation rules that maximizes a
social welfare function over the set of core allocations can be characterized in terms of
the “social desirability” of giving payoﬀ to the members of coalition S in the sense that
their total payoﬀ is maximal given core constraints. Moreover, “social desirability” can
be expressed in terms of marginal social welfare of each individual’s payoﬀ. We also show
that no solution maximizing a social welfare function is monotonic with respect to the
grand coalition.
While there are S-monotonic core selections on the domain of all coalitional games with
nonempty core, this turns out to be a feature that is closely connected with the presence
of side payments. Indeed, if coalitional games without side payments are considered, then
the previously derived results (characterizing S-monotonic core selection rules) may be
exploited to yield an impossibility result: Even for a ﬁxed coalition S there cannot be core
selection rules that are monotonic. This shows that the non-monotonicity in coalitional
worth is a feature which is inherent in any solution satisfying the coalitional stability (core)
conditions.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we give the necessary deﬁnitions (in
the context of coalitional games with side payments); the basic characterization result
is given in Section 3; it exploits the characterization of games with nonempty core by
balancedness and exploits some details concerning suitable balanced families of coalitions,
which have been collected in an appendix. In Section 4, we establish the relationship
2between S-monotonicity and the partial derivatives of the social welfare function and
in Section 5 we consider special coalitions. In Section 6 we extend the investigation to
coalitional games without side payments and give the impossibility result in this context,
and ﬁnally, Section 7 has the function of an appendix containing the statement and proof
of the intermediary result needed in Section 3.
2 Preliminaries
A coalitional game with side payments, is a pair (N,v) where N = {1,...,n} is a nonempty
ﬁnite set of players, and v is a function (called the characteristic function of the game)
that associates a positive real number v(S) with each subset S of N, such that v(∅)=0 .
The set of all such games is denoted G. For ﬁxed N, the set of all games in G with player
set N can be identiﬁed with a closed subset of R2N
, where 2N is the power set of N.A s
N is ﬁxed in the following we shall write v instead of (N,v) for notational simplicity.
Let v ∈G . A payoﬀ vector is a member x of RN
+; each payoﬀ vector gives rise to an
additive set function such that x(S)=
 
i∈S xi. We use the notation xS for the projection
of the payoﬀ vector x on RS
+, where S ⊂ N.
For v ∈G , the core of v is the subset C(v)o fRN
+ deﬁned by
C(v)={x ∈ RN
+ | x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N and x(N)=v(N)}.
In the following we restrict our attention to the class of games for which the core is
non-empty, i.e. the class B⊂Gof balanced games, cf. Bondareva [1]. For later reference,
we give the deﬁnition of balancedness and introduce some notation.
Let ei denote the ith unit vector in Euclidean space, and let  N = {x ∈ RN
+ |  n
h=1 xh =1 } = conv(e1,...,e n). We denote by  S the face of  N determined by
S ⊂ N, that is  S = {x ∈  N | xi = 0 for i/ ∈ S}, and we let ˆ eS = |S|−1  
i∈S ei be the
barycenter of  S, for S ⊂ N. Clearly ˆ e{i} = ei for each i ∈ N. A family D of coalitions
is balanced if there are non-negative weights λT, for T ∈D , such that
 
T∈D,i∈T λT =1
for each i ∈ N, or, equivalently, if eN ∈ conv({ˆ eT | T ∈D } ). A game v is balanced if  
T∈D λTv(T) ≤ v(N) for every balanced family of coalitions.
A solution on B is a function φ : B→RN
+, for which each game v ∈Ballocates v(N)
among the players, that is φ(v) ∈{ x ∈ RN
+ | x(N)=v(N)}. A solution is a core selection
if φ(v) ∈ C(v) for each v ∈B .
We shall be interested in a particular class of core selections: Suppose that u : RN
+ → R
is strictly concave and diﬀerentiable, and deﬁne the u-selection φu by
φu(v) = argmax{u(x) | x ∈ C(v)}
(note that since C(v) is a closed and convex subset, there is a unique maximizer of u on
C(v)).
Since a u-selection only depends on the core constraints, well-known solution concepts
such as the nucleolus - or the Shapley value of convex games1 - cannot be represented as a
u-selection. Contrary to selections such as the nucleolus or the Shapley value, a u-selection
1A game v is convex if v(S)+v(T) ≤ v(S ∩ T)+v(S ∪ T) for all S,T ⊆ N.
3satisﬁes a version of independence of irrelevant alternatives in the sense that if a point
x ∈ C(v)i sau-selection for some game v then this point is also the u-selection for any
game v  for which the core is a subset of C(v) that contains x.
Example 2.1 In convex games, the core contains a unique Lorenz-maximal element (see
e.g. the Egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray [2]) that can be found by maximizing the
following strictly concave function uL(x)=−
 n
i=1 x2
i for x ∈ C(v). Thus, the selection
of the Lorenz-maximal point in the core is in fact a u-selection as deﬁned above. In fact,
as long as we consider convex games (or other classes of games for which the Lorenz-
maximum is unique) we could have chosen any separable function u(x)=
 n
i=1 f(xi)
where f is strictly concave by Theorem 108 of Hardy et al. [3]. For balanced games in
general there may by many Lorenz-maxima in the core and consequently the speciﬁc form
of u becomes important.2
Let S ⊂ N be a nonempty coalition. A solution φ on B is called S-monotonic if for all
v,w ∈Band i ∈ S,
[v(S) <w (S),v(T)=w(T)i fT  = S] ⇒ φi(v) ≤ φi(w).
The solution φ is said to be coalitionally monotonic if φ is S-monotonic for all S ⊆ N.I ti s
well-known (cf. Young [15] and Housman and Clark [8]) that on the class of balanced games
no core selection satisﬁes coalitional monotonicity (for |N|≥4). In other words, all core
selections, including those of the form φu considered here, must violate S-monotonicity
for some coalition S. We shall return to this result (in the context of core selections of
the type φu considered here) at a later stage, where it will emerge as a simple corollary of
our characterization to follow.
Since S-monotonicity (for S  = N) is a way of formulating that society wants to give
all agents in coalition S incentive to increase the total worth of S, it is also to be expected
that the choice within the core results in a favourable position of coalition S. A straight
forward way to favour S would be to use a utilitarian social welfare function in the sense
that u(x)=
 
i∈S x(i); however, this social welfare function does not satisfy our general
condition of strict concavity. Thus, we say that φu is S-utilitarian if φu maximizes x(S)
over all x ∈ C(v), for each v ∈B . In the next section, we show that the intuitive
relationship between S-monotonicity and S-utilitarianism holds, at least when games and
coalitions of very small size are disregarded.
3 A characterization of S-monotonic core selections
The main result of this section demonstrates that if the u-selection φu is S-monotonic, then
it is also S-utilitarian and vice versa. In this sense it looks as if the social welfare function
singles out the total payoﬀ of the coalition S as the overall criterion to be maximized
given the core constraints. As we shall see in Section 4, the result that social welfare
maximization works “as if” the total payoﬀ of the members of S is maximized over the
core, is indeed sustained by the properties of u (the social welfare criterion) which will
2By Theorem 2 in Hougaard et al. [6] any Lorenz-maximum in the core of a balanced game is the
maximizer of some additive and concave social welfare function.
4exhibit higher marginal social welfare of the payoﬀs of members in S than of the payoﬀs
of individuals not in S.
We record the ﬁrst main result:
Theorem 3.1 For |N|≥4 and |S|≥3, the u-selection φu is S-monotonic if and only if
it is S-utilitarian.
Proof: “If”: Assume that φu is S-utilitarian, and consider two games v,w ∈Bsuch that
w(S) >v (S),w (T)=v(T) for all T  = S.
Since φu is S-utilitarian, we have that x = φu(v) satisﬁes x(S) >v (S) (otherwise C(w)
would be empty). But then x belongs also to C(w) (only the worth of S has changed),
and since C(w) ⊂ C(v), we conclude that x maximizes u on C(w), that is φu(w)=x,s o
that trivially φu
i (w) ≥ φu
i (v) for all i ∈ S.
“Only if”: Assume the core selection is not S-utilitarian; then there is a game v such




Without loss of generality we may assume that v(N) = 1 and that x(S)=v(S), since
otherwise we consider the game v  with v (T)=v(T) for T  = S and v (S)=x(S).
By Lemma 7.1 (in the Appendix) we may assume that v is such that for some i ∈ S,
the family C of coalitions T with x(T)=v(T) either do not contain i, or they are equal to
S. Moreover, the family C cannot be balanced: Suppose to the contrary that there were
λT, T ∈Csuch that
 







since C(v)  = ∅, and since x(S) < maxy∈C(v) y(S), there is ε>0 such that the game v 
with
v (T)=v(T) for T  = S, v (S)=v(S)+ε
satisﬁes C(v )  = ∅. But then
 
T∈C λTv (T) >v (N), a contradiction, showing that C
cannot be balanced.
Consider now the family
D = C∪{ N\{i,j},(N\S) ∪{ j}},
where j ∈ S, j  = i, is chosen such that x 
j >x j for some x  ∈ C(v) by Lemma 7.1. We
claim that D is not balanced. Indeed, if D were balanced, then the weight λS would be
equal to 1 since S is the only coalition in D containing i. But then the weights of any
coalition intersecting S, including the coalitions N\{i,j} and (N\S) ∪{ j}, must be 0, so
that the family C is balanced, contrary to what has been shown above.





x(T)i f T ∈D , T  = S,
v(S)+ε for T = S,
v(S) otherwise
5is balanced for ε>0 small enough: Indeed, if H is a balanced family, then it must contain
some coalition T such that x(T) >v (T), and choosing ε smaller than x(T) − v(T) for all
such T we get the claim.
Let z = argmaxy∈C(w)u(y); we now show that z({i}) <x ({i}). Indeed, we must have
z({i,j}) ≤ x({i,j}) since w(N\{i,j})=x(N\{i,j}). Also z(N\S ∪{j}) ≥ x(N\S ∪{j}).
Since z(N\S) ≤ x(N\S)−ε, we must have that z({j}) >x ({j}). But then it follows that
z({i}) <x ({i}).
4 Applications of the characterization
With the result of Theorem 3.1, we may obtain further properties of the selected core
elements, for example that if a u-selection is S monotonic then all members of S have a
strictly higher marginal utility than all non-members:
Theorem 4.1 For |N|≥4 and |S|≥3,i fφu is S-monotonic, then u 
i(x) >u  
j(x), for all
x ∈ intRN
+, i ∈ S and j ∈ N\S.
Proof: Let x ∈ intRN
+ be arbitrary, and choose a game v ∈Bsuch that φu(v)=x (such
a game exists, e.g. the additive game deﬁned by x). By Theorem 3.1, we may assume that
x(N\S)=v(N\S). Let w be the game such that w(T)=x(T) if either (i) T ⊆ N\S
or (ii) N\S ⊂ T and T = T  ∪ (N\S) for some T  such that x(T )=v(T); for all other
coalitions, w(T)=0 .
By our construction, x ∈ C(w), so w ∈B . For each coalition S  such that the inequality
x(S ) ≥ v(S ) is binding (i.e. an equality) at x in the game v, we have either S  ⊂ N\S,
so that x(S )=w(S ) by condition (i) above, or S  ∩ S  = ∅. Let D =( N\S)\S ; by (ii),
w(S ∪(N\S)) = x(S ∪(N\S)), and from this together with x(S ∪(N\S)) = x(S )+x(D)
we get that
x(S )=w(S  ∪ (N\S)) − w(D)=v(S )
so that the same binding equality must hold in the game x. Consequently there is a
neighborhood U if x such that C(w) ∩ U ⊂ C(v) ∩ U, and therefore φu(w)=x.
We conclude that there is a game w such that x ∈ φu(w) and for all coalitions T with











λT − µ, i =1 ,...,n,
where for each T, λT > 0 only if x(T)=w(T) (the complementary slackness condition).
Since each j ∈ N\S belongs to all the coalitions T having some member from S, we get
that u 
i(x) ≥ u 
j(x) for all i ∈ S, j ∈ N\S.
6In order to complete the proof of the theorem, assume that there is u 
i(x)=u 
j(x) for
some i ∈ S, j ∈ N\S. Since the map f : R → R with
f(t)=u(x1,...,x i + t,...,x j − t,...,x n)
is diﬀerentiable and strictly concave in a neighborhood of t = 0, with f (0) = u 
i(x) −
u 
j(x) = 0, we have that f (t) > 0 for t<0 and f (t) < 0 for t>0, from which we
conclude that u 
i(x ) <u  
j(x ) for some x  in a neighborhood of x, contradicting what was
shown above. We conclude that u 
i(x) >u  
j(x) for all i ∈ S, j ∈ N\S.
As mentioned in the previous section, Young [15] showed that no core selection rule
can be coalitionally monotonic on games with ﬁve or more players, a result that was
strengthened by Housman and Clark [8], showing that this result holds also for games
with four players. In the particular case of u-selections, this follows from Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.2 Let |N|≥4. No core allocation method maximizing a social welfare
function is coalitionally monotonic.
Proof: Theorem 4.1 cannot be satisﬁed for all S ⊂ N for any u-selection.
We may remark that on the particular class of convex games it was shown in Hougaard,
Peleg and Østerdal [7], that if the social welfare function is separable, i.e. u(x)=
 n
i=1 ui(xi)
then φu (called a Generalized Lorenz-solution) satisﬁes S-monotonicity for all S ⊆ N.I n
other words, for convex games, some u-selections may satisfy coalitional monotonicity.
5 Special coalitions
Clearly, the grand coalition has its own interest since all agents of society ought to have
incentive to increase the total worth to be shared. It is well known that there are core
allocation methods that are aggregate monotonic (N-monotonic) as for example the per
capita nucleolus (cf. e.g. Young [15]). However, unfortunately it can be shown that u-
selections cannot be aggregate monotonic. In this sense there will always be members
of society who have incentives to block actions that increase the total worth of society
independent of the choice of social welfare function.
Theorem 5.1 Let |N|≥3. Then there exists no N-monotonic u-selection φu.
Proof: Since u is strictly convex, the set of gradients u (x) for x ∈ intRN
+ is an open set,
and in particular, there is x ∈ intRN
+ such that the coordinates u 
i(x), for i ∈ N, possibly
after a renumbering, satisfy
{u 
1(x),...,u 
n−3(x)} <u  
n−2(x) < {u 
n−1(x),u  
n(x)}
(where A<rand r<Bfor r ∈ R, A,B ⊂ R means that a<rand r<bfor each
a ∈ A, b ∈ B). Now, deﬁne the game v as follows: v({i})=xi for all i  = {n − 2}, and
v({n − 2})=xn−2 − λ, for some λ>0. Moreover, let v({n − 2},{n − 1})=xn−2 + xn−1,
v({n − 2},{n})=xn−2 + xn, v(N)=x1 + ... + xn and v(T) = 0 otherwise. Then C(v)=
{x} = φu(v) (indeed, only the payoﬀ of player n − 2 can be reduced without violating
7the constraints of the singleton coalitions, but any such reduction must be matched by an
equal increase in the payoﬀs of both n − 1 and n, which is impossible).
Now, deﬁne a new game w where w(N)=v(N)+ε for some small enough ε>0, and
w(T)=v(T) for T  = N. In C(w), the payoﬀs of all individuals may be increased, but by
our assumptions on u (x), the value of u grows more if the payoﬀ is increased for players
n − 1 and n than if any other player gets larger payoﬀ. Indeed, increasing xn by ε will
produce tghe highest increase in u; but then xn−2 may be reduced by this same ε amount
without violating the constraint deﬁned for the coalition {n − 2,n}, and this amount ε
may be shifted from n − 2t on − 1, so that the constraint deﬁned for {n − 2,n− 1} is
satisﬁed, once again producing an increase in u. It follows that
φu(w)=( x1,...,xn−3,x n−2 − ε,xn−1 + ε,xn + ε),
contradicting N-monotonicity.
Finally, Theorems 3.1 and 4.1 do not consider cases where |S| < 3. Clearly, it follows
directly from the core conditions that all u-selections are monotonic with respect to single
player coalitions. However, if |S| = 2 problems with monotonicity may occur:




xi +1 ) , where
α = (10,1,100,100,100,100,100). Moreover, let the game v be deﬁned as follows; v(N)=
3,v(1,2) = v(1,3) = v(1,4) = v(2,5) = v(2,6) = v(2,7) = 1, and v(T) = 0 otherwise.
We observe that φu(v)=( 0 ,1,1,1,0,0,0). Now, deﬁne a new game w as w(1,2 )=2
and w(T)=v(T) otherwise. The new solution is φu(w)=( 1 .33,0.66,0,0,0.33,0.33,0.33)
where player 2 is worse oﬀ, i.e., the solution φu is not {1,2}-monotonic.
6 Core selections for games without side payments
In this section, we extend some of the results of the previous sections to games without
side payments. For a given set of players N = {1,...,n}, a game without side payments
V assigns to each coalition S a subset V (S)o fRS, assumed to be nonempty, closed and
comprehensive (meaning that V (S) − RS
+ ⊂ V (S)).
A payoﬀ vector in V is an element of V (N). The core of V is the set of payoﬀ vectors
x which are Pareto optimal in the sense that if y ∈ V (N) and yi ≥ xi for all i ∈ N, then
y = x and undominated: there is no coalition S such that xS ∈ intV (S). The core of the
game V is denoted C(V ).
We shall make use of a particular class of games without side payments in the sequel:
Let v be a game with side payments and let λ ∈  N. Then the λ-weighted game with






Let V be a family of games without side payments with non-empty cores; a core
selection on V is a map ψ which to each game V ∈Vassigns an element ψ(V )o fC(V ).
If u : RN
+ → R is a function which is diﬀerentiable and strictly concave, we deﬁne a core
selection ψu to be a u-selection if
ψu(V ) ∈{ x ∈ C(V ) | u(x) ≥ u(x ), all x  ∈ C(V )}.
8The notion of S-monotonicity introduced previously for games with side payments
cannot be transferred immediately to games without side payments, but a reasonable way
of capturing the notion that increased power of the coalition makes all its members better
oﬀ might be the following deﬁnition: A core selection ψ is S-monotonic if ψi(V  ) ≥ ψi(V ),
all i ∈ S, for all games V , V   such that V (T)=V  (T) for all T  = S and V (S) ⊂ V  (S).
As it will turn out presently, the notion of S-monotonicity is of limited relevance in the
context of games without side payments, at least when attention is restricted to selections
which are obtained by maximizing a social welfare function of the core of a game. Indeed,
we prove the following impossibility theorem:
Theorem 6.1 Let |N|≥4 and let V be a family of games without side payments con-
taining all the games Vλ,v for λ ∈  N, v ∈B , and let u : RN
+ → R be diﬀerentiable and
concave. If ψu is a core selection on V and S ⊂ N is a coalition with |S|≥3, then ψu is
not S-monotonic.
Proof: Choose λ ∈ int N arbitrarily and consider the set of all λ-weighted games with
side payments Vλ. Trivially, the game Vλ is transformed to a game with side payments by
the coordinate transformation
x  → hλ(x)=( λ1x1,...,λ nxn), (1)
which has the inverse transformation










The mapping u : RN











Assume now that the core selection ψu deﬁned on the family V of games without side
payments is S-monotonic. For each λ ∈ int N, the restriction of ψu to the set of λ-
weighted games Vλ,v for v ∈Bgives rise to a core selection ψuλ on the set of all balanced
games (with side payments) B; indeed, the transformation in (1) takes C(Vλ) to the core
of the transformed game with side payments, and if x ∈ C(Vλ) maximizes u, then hλ(x)
maximizes uλ on the core of the transformed game. Also, uλ is diﬀerentiable and strictly
concave.
Finally, we see that if ψu is S-monotonic on the set of λ-weighted games with side
payments Vλ, then ψuλ is S-monotonic on G. Applying now Theorem 4.1, we get that
for any y ∈ intRN
+,w eh a ve( uλ) 
i(y) > (uλ) 
j(y) for all i ∈ S, j ∈ N\S, and using the








, all i ∈ S, j ∈ N\S
at any x ∈ intRN
+. But since λ was chosen arbitrarily in int N, we have a contradiction.
97 Appendix: Proof of main lemma
In this section we state and prove the main lemma which was used in the proof of Theorem
3.1.
Lemma 7.1 Let |N|≥3, let S ⊂ N be a coalition with |S|≥2. Suppose that v ∈Bis
a such that x = φu(v) belongs to intRN
+ and satisﬁes x(S)=v(S) and x (S) >v (S) for
some x  ∈ C(v). Then there is a game v  and i ∈ S such that
(i) φu(v )=φu(v)=x,
(ii) if v (T)=x(T) for some T ⊂ N, then either i/ ∈ T,o rT = S.
(iii) C(v ) contains points x  with x 
j >x j, for some j ∈ S, j  = i.
Proof: Normalizing if necessary we may assume that v(N) = 1. Since x maximizes u on
C(v) it solves the maximization problem
max u(x)
s.t.
x(T) ≥ v(T),T⊂ N, T  = N,
x(N)=1 .
In this maximization problem, if T is such that x(T) >v (T), then we may remove the
constraint x(T) ≥ v(T) and still have the solution x; indeed, we may focus only on the set
of zero-excess coalitions C satisfying x(T)=v(T) (including S).
Next, note that we search for solutions y over vectors in H =a ﬀ  N = {x |
 n
i=1 xi =







Then the family of halfspaces (in H) consisting of
{x  ∈ H | x (T) ≥ v(T)} =
 












for T belonging to the family C = {S  ⊂ N | x(S )=v(S )} and the halfspace {x  ∈ H |
ˆ u  · x  > ˆ u  · x}, have empty intersection (since otherwise there would be a point x  close
to x satisfying all constraints and giving a larger value of the objective function).
By duality, we have that 0 can be written as a nonnegative sum of the normals of these
halfspaces (see e.g. Rockafellar [10]). Clearly, ˆ u  is a normal of {x  ∈ H | ˆ u  · x  > ˆ u  · x},





λT[ˆ eN − ˆ eT]=0 ,λ T ≥ 0,T∈C . (2)
By our construction, S ∈C ; also, λT > 0 for each T by the minimality of C. Multiplying
all λi by some constant if necessary, we may assume that
 
T∈C λT = 1; ﬁnally, we may
10replace u by the function λ0u without changing the core selection φu, so that we may
assume that λ0 = 1. Consequently, (2) can be written as
u  +ˆ eN =
 
T∈C
λTˆ eT,λ T ≥ 0,T∈C . (3)
Conversely, if
u  +ˆ eN =
 
T∈C 
µTˆ eT,µ T ≥ 0,T∈C  ,
 
T∈C 
µT =1 , (4)




i∈T xi, for each T ∈C  
We claim that the family C  in (4) can be chosen such that S ∈C   and some i ∈ S is
in no other coalition in C , so that we have proved part (i) and (ii) for the game v  with
v (T)=
 
i∈T xi for T ∈C   and v (T) = 0 otherwise, if we can ﬁnd a family of coalitions
containing S such that ˆ u (x)+ˆ eN belongs to the convex hull of the associated barycenters.
Let z ∈  N be arbitrary, then z =
 n
i=1 ziˆ ei, and put ˆ S = {i ∈ S | zi  =0 }.I f
ˆ S has less than 2 members, then there are i,j ∈ S with zi = zj = 0, and the family
C  = {{i}|zi > 0}∪S satisﬁes our claim; also (iii) is satisﬁed since C(v ) contains points
x  with x 
j >x j.
Thus, we may assume that |ˆ S|≥2. Let i0 ∈ ˆ S be such that zi0 = mini∈ˆ S zi, let
λˆ S = zi0|ˆ S|,λ {i} = zi − zi0,i ∈ ˆ S, λ{j} = zj,j/ ∈ ˆ S and λS =0i fS  = ˆ S,



















(zi − zi0)ˆ ei +
 
i/ ∈S

















ziˆ ei + zi0ˆ ei0 = z,
showing that our claim is satisﬁed with i ∈ S\ˆ S if this set is nonempty, i = i0 otherwise.
Finally, by our construction we have that for any j ∈ S\{i0} we have that C(v ) contains
elements x  with x 
j >x j, proving (iii).
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